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Reviving the Market for Liability Theories:
The "Commingled Product" Theory of




Faced with multiple defendants and plaintiffs with causation
problems, several state courts have employed market share liability
theories to circumvent dismissal and apportion liability among
defendants in litigation surrounding in utero exposure to a toxic
pharmaceutical,1 transmission of HIV from contaminated blood
products,2 lead paint poisoning,3 and groundwater contamination by a
gasoline additive.4 Market share liability applies when a plaintiff can
establish every element of her tort claim except the identification of the
actual tortfeasor(s) that caused her injury and has joined potential
tortfeasors representing a "substantial share" of the product market. In
that situation, defendants are held liable for the portion of the judgment
5that represents each defendant's market share at the time of the injury.
A number of distinct theories emerged within the market share liability
framework.6 Still, some courts declined to accept the theory and many
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2007; B.A. English, magna cum laude, Millersville University, 2001. The
author wishes to thank her husband and parents for their support through the comment
writing process.
1. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980).
2. See Ray v. Cutter Labs., 754 F. Supp. 193, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
3. See Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 558 (Wis. 2005).
4. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig. (MTBE 1),
379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
5. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-37.
6. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1991) (applying due
diligence requirement to market share liability); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823
P.2d 717, 728 (Haw. 1991) (applying national market share liability); Hymowitz v. Eli
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state supreme courts expressly rejected it.7 In April 2005, however, the
"commingled product" theory of market share liability emerged in In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE') Products Liability Litigation.8
Under the "commingled product" theory,
[w]hen a plaintiff can prove that certain gaseous or liquid products
... of many suppliers were present in a completely commingled or
blended state at the time and place that the risk of harm occurred, and
the commingled product caused a single indivisible injury, then each
of the products should be deemed to have caused the harm.
This theory presents an innovative approach to market share
liability. 10 It first requires a plaintiff to conduct an investigation to
identify, in good faith, defendants who caused the injury rather than
name all market participants." The burden then shifts to each defendant
to exculpate itself by proving that its product was not present at the
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (applying culpability-based theory of
market share liability); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 381 (Wash. 1984)
(applying market share alternate liability theory); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d
37, 51 (Wis. 1984) (applying risk contribution theory of market share liability).
7. See, e.g., Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510, 514 (10th Cir. 1994); Mulcahy
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Iowa 1986); Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696
N.E.2d 187, 192-93 (Ohio 1998); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169,
172 (Pa. 1997) (finding market share liability inapplicable on the facts of the case, but
recognizing that there may arise a situation which would compel the court to adopt
market share liability).
8. 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 377-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
9. Id. at 377-78.
10. The term "innovative" is used to describe the inclusion of the plaintiff's
investigation requirement in a market share liability theory. The MTBE court clearly
enunciated the Second Circuit's directive that when a federal court must apply the law of
another state, the court should not adopt innovative theories of causation that may distort
established state law. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig.
(MTBE 1l), No. 1:00-1898, M 21-88, MDL 1358(SAS), 2005 WL 3005794, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005). Other circuits share the Second Circuit's reluctance to adopt
theories that distort state law. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 672 (7th
Cir. 2004) ("A litigant who wants an adventurous interpretation of state law should sue in
state court ... rather than ask [federal courts] to declare such an interpretation to be the
law of [the state]."); Birchler v. Gehl Co., 88 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that in
diversity cases, the court's policy will be to require plaintiffs desiring to succeed on novel
state law claims to present those claims in state court); accord Pearson v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 1992) ("A litigant who seeks out a federal
forum when a state-court forum is equally available to him cannot justifiably complain if
the federal court manifests great caution in blazing new state-law trails.").
The MTBE court also noted that since the plaintiffs did not bring their actions in
federal court, but the actions were removed to federal court by the defendants, the federal
court could utilize the "principle of dual sovereignty," which requires the application of a
liberal construction of state law. MTBE II, 2005 WL 3005794, at *2. This principle
protects the party who sought resolution in state court before the opposing party removed
the action to federal court. Id.
11. SeeMTBEI,379F. Supp.2dat 378.
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relevant time and place of the plaintiffs injury.12
The commingled product theory and other modified market share
liability theories are particularly well suited for toxic tort litigation.
13
These theories tend to apply when a mass-produced substance is
defective or toxic and cannot be traced to a specific manufacturer.
14
The "commingled product" theory of market share liability emerged
because plaintiffs presented facts that did not fit an existing collective
liability theory. Thus, without the "commingled product" theory,
plaintiffs would not have survived dismissal motions.' 5 This Comment
posits that the evolutive nature of the MTBE court's ruling illustrates the
capability of courts to fashion practical theories that respond to the facts
of complex litigation. Compared to other common law liability theories,
such as negligence, market share liability remains in its infant stages.
16
This Comment analyzes the existing theories of collective liability,
the application of the "commingled product" theory in the MTBE
litigation, issues in pleading market share liability, and the possible
application of the theory in subsequent cases, particularly toxic tort
litigation. This Comment suggests that courts and litigants not discount
the theory, despite its adoption by only a minority of states. Rather,
courts should consider, and litigants should advocate, the utility and cost-
spreading aspects of market share liability. Courts hesitant to adopt
traditional market share liability can replicate the approach used by the
MTBE court in fashioning the "commingled product" theory. In
addition, the potential accusation of judicial activism should not stop
courts from adopting modified theories of market share liability.
II. The History of Collective Liability Theories
Courts began to use collective liability theories to apportion liability
among multiple defendants, any of whom could have caused the
plaintiff's injury. 17 The touchstones of any collective liability theory are
12. See id.
13. See 1-3 Guide to Toxic Torts (MB) § 3.09 (2005).
14. Id.
15. See MTBE 1, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
16. Cf WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 142-43 (3d ed. 1964). The cause of
action for negligence was recognized as a separate basis of tort liability in the mid-
nineteenth century. Id. at 143. The cause of action emerged from a "reshuffling" of the
common law actions of trespass and "trespass on the case." Id. Trespass was a remedy
of direct, immediate injuries, id. at 28, while "trespass on the case" was a remedy for
indirect, non-forcible injuries, id. at 29. The theory of negligence as a basis of liability
was considered a "fairly modem concept" in 1951, after about one hundred years of
development. Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA.
L. REV. 359, 364 (1951).
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 10, 11,
15 (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (joint and several liability, several liability, and
2006]
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the existence of more than one possible tortfeasor and a plaintiffs injury
that cannot be traced to a particular defendant.' 8
A. Joint and Several Liability
When the independent tortious conduct of two or more tortfeasors
causes a plaintiffs indivisible injury, each tortfeasor is jointly and
severally liable for damages. 19 The plaintiff is only required to show that
a tortfeasor was "a legal cause of the plaintiffs injury, not that the
tortfeasor was the sole legal cause.,
20
Under joint and several liability, the plaintiff may sue and recover
damages from any defendant found liable.2' The plaintiff may recover
the full amount of damages from any jointly and severally liable pariy.
22
Thus, the burden is on the defendants, not the plaintiff, to join other
tortfeasors and assert contribution claims against them.23 The risk that
any jointly and severally liable tortfeasor may be insolvent is born by the
solvent jointly and severally liable tortfeasor(s).24
In states that do not recognize joint and several liability, but instead
only recognize several liability, a defendant is liable for the share of the
plaintiffs damages caused by that particular defendant.25  When "a
person is severally liable to an injured person for an indivisible injury,
the injured person may recover only the severally liable person's
comparative-responsibility share of the injured person's damages. 26
Under several liability, a percentage of the damages may be assigned to
joined parties based on their comparative responsibility.27
concert of action liability).
18. Cf James v. Bessemer Processing Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 898, 909 (N.J. 1998)
(noting that when courts use collective liability theories, it is because the specific
tortfeasor that caused the plaintiffs injury cannot be identified).
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § A18. As of 2000, only fifteen jurisdictions still
employed pure joint and several liability. Id. § 17 cmt. a.
20. Id. § 10cmt. b.
21. Id. § A18 cmt. a.
22. Id. § 10; see also Commonwealth v. Boston Edison Co., 828 N.E.2d 16, 21 n.4
(Mass. 2005) (explaining the difference in application between joint and several liability
and several liability).
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § A18 cmt. a.
24. Id.
25. Id. § B18. The same test applies to the finding of several liability as to the
finding of joint and several liability. The independent tortious conduct of two or more
tortfeasors must be the legal cause of the plaintiffs indivisible injury for several liability
to apply. Id. The fact finder apportions the comparative share of the plaintiff's damages
to each severally liable defendant. Id.
26. Id. § 11.
27. See id. § 11 cmt. a.
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B. Concert ofAction Liability
Understood as a form of vicarious liability, concert of action
liability arises when the plaintiff can prove a conspiracy between two or
more tortfeasors.28 Under this theory, one defendant is responsible for
the actions of another when it:
(a) [performs] a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design[], or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct [itself], or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and [its] own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the [plaintiff].
Tortfeasors who act in concert are held joint and severally liable "for the
share of comparative responsibility assigned to each [tortfeasor] engaged
in the concerted activity.,
30
C. Alternative Liability
First applied in Summers v. Tice,31 alternative liability provides that
when multiple defendants are liable for the plaintiffs injury and the
plaintiff cannot prove which defendant caused the injury, all defendants
are held liable.32 Each defendant then has the burden to absolve itself of
liability.33 In Summers, two defendants and the plaintiff were hunting
when each defendant shot toward the plaintiff's direction.34 The plaintiff
was shot in the eye and lip, but because both defendants used the same
size shot, the shots could not be attributed to one defendant.
35
The Summers court reasoned that where two defendants are
independently liable for the plaintiffs harm, the defendants should be
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). A "conspiracy" exists for the
purpose of concert of action liability when wrongful acts were done pursuant to an
express common plan or design to cooperate in tortious conduct. Id. § 876 cmt. b.
29. Id. § 876.
30.- RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 15. In jurisdictions that abolished or modified
joint and several liability, that abolition or modification is superseded by this section of
the Restatement, which imposes joint and several liability on all tortfeasors engaged in
concerted action. Id. § 15 cmt. a.
31. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.
2006]
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left to work out the apportionment of damages between them.36 Even
though the plaintiff could not prove which tortfeasor caused his injury,
he was not deprived of recovery.37 The alternative liability approach
taken by the Summers court was codified in the Second Restatement of
Torts.38
D. Enterprise Liability
Applied in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., enterprise
liability apportions damages based on industry-wide practices. 39  The
Hall opinion focused on three factors in holding nearly all United States
manufacturers of dynamite blasting caps liable for the injuries of thirteen
children.40  First, defendants jointly controlled the risk associated with
their products.41 Second, the defendants were in the best position to
reduce costs from injuries.42  Third, apportioning liability among
defendant manufacturers provided a remedy for innocent plaintiffs.
43
One other court employed enterprise liability, or a modified version
of concerted action liability, and relied on the factors adopted by the Hall
36. Id.
37. Id. The Summers court's overriding concern was that the innocent plaintiff not
be precluded from recovery for his injuries. See id. at 5. This concern pervades courts'
applications of collective liability theories. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d
1069, 1077 (N.Y. 1989); see also Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 727
(Haw. 1991) (adopting a modified theory of market share liability in part because
defendants may bear the loss by passing the cost of doing business on to customers).
Another often-cited rationale for imposing liability is that imposing industry-wide
liability promotes safety by providing the industry with an incentive to discover and
correct dangerous products. 1-8 Products Liability Practice Guide (MB) § 8.07(1)
(2005).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
39. 345 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Two cases were consolidated in Hall.
Id. at 358. In the case involving plaintiffs who could identify the manufacturers of the
blasting caps that caused their injuries, the court found enterprise liability inapplicable.
Id. at 382-83. In the case involving plaintiffs who could not identify the blasting cap
manufacturers, the court held defendants jointly liable through enterprise liability if
plaintiffs could prove the defendants' "joint awareness of the risks at issue ... and their
joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks." Id. at 378. The court noted this theory
applies to industries composed of a small number of manufacturers and cautioned that
"[w]hat would be fair and feasible with regard to an industry of five or ten producers
might be manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of
thousands of small producers." Id.
40. Id. at 371. Judge Jack B. Weinstein authored the Hall opinion. Judge Weinstein
presided over many mass torts, including the Agent Orange, tobacco, asbestos, and
handgun cases. 1 ALMANAC OF THE FED. JUDICIARY 142, 142-144 (Aspen 2006). Judge
Weinstein became Chief Judge for the Eastern District of New York in 1980 and has
served as a Senior Judge since 1993. Id. at 142.
41. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at371.
42. Id. at 378.
43. Id. at 379.
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court 4  In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., a New York diethistibestrol
(DES) 45 case, the court upheld a jury verdict finding three DES
manufacturers liable for the plaintiffs injury.46 The Bichler court found
that the defendant DES manufacturers acted in concert and specifically
noted that control of the risk can be shown by "evidence of an explicit
agreement, by evidence of defendants' parallel behavior sufficient to
support an inference of tacit agreement or co-operation, or by evidence
of independent adherence to industry-wide safety standards."
4 7
In 1989, New York's highest court overruled Bichler's adoption of
enterprise liability in DES cases. 48 Instead, the court adopted the market
share liability theory because the court found that theory "[a] narrower
basis for liability, tailored more closely to the varying culpableness of
",49individual DES producers....
E. Market Share Liability
Market share liability is the most recent addition to the collective
liability theories.50 Adopted in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, traditional
market share liability applies when an innocent plaintiff cannot prove
which of the negligent defendants caused her injury.5' The burden of
identification shifts to the defendants if the plaintiff can establish every
element of her claim except identification of the actual tortfeasor(s) and
has joined potential tortfeasors representing a "substantial share" of the
product market.5 2  Courts hold defendants severally liable53 for the
portion of the judgment that represents that defendant's market share at
the time of the injury.
54
44. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); see
also 5-55 Products Liability (MB) § 55.02(9)(d) (2005) (noting that nearly every court to
address it has rejected enterprise liability).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 55 and 56.
46. Bichler, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627, 636.
47. Id. at 633.
48. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076 (N.Y. 1989).
49. Id. at 1076.
50. See 1-3 Guide to Toxic Torts (MB) § 3.09 (2005) (citing Sindell v. Abbott Labs.,
607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980)). Interestingly, the Sindell court modified a theory of enterprise
liability set forth in a law review comment. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 943 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting). Although the court ultimately rejected the author's suggested factors for
instituting the modified enterprise liability theory, it used several of the factors in
reaching its conclusion on market share liability. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934-35; see
also Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978).
51. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
52. Id. at 936-37.
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § B 18 and accompanying text.
54. Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 487 (Cal. 1988) (refining the Sindell
definition of market share liability by holding defendants only severally liable, rather
2006]
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In Sindell, the plaintiff sued eleven pharmaceutical companies for
injuries caused by in utero exposure to the drug DES.55 DES was linked
to reproductive health problems, including cancer, in women whose
mothers had ingested DES during pregnancy.56 Over two hundred
manufacturers57 marketed DES in generic form 58 as a safe and effective
treatment to prevent miscarriage. Due to the drug's generic nature and
the long latency period between ingestion by her mother and the
beginning of her symptoms, the plaintiff could not identify the particular
manufacturer of the DES ingested by her mother.59  The California
Supreme Court found existing collective liability theories inadequate to
60apportion liability among defendant DES manufacturers.
Market share liability illustrates the utility of judicial adaptation.61
It allows a plaintiff to overcome the requirement of definitively linking
her injury to a particular defendant.62
Market share liability also allows plaintiffs to survive motions to
dismiss. Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,63 a
plaintiffs complaint must include a statement showing she is entitled to
relief.64 This requirement is difficult to satisfy for a plaintiff who cannot
identify the particular defendants that caused her injury.65 Market share
than jointly and severally liable).
55. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926.
56. Id. at 925.
57. Id. at 935.
58. Id. at 926, 928 n.6.
59. Id. at 925-26.
60. Id. at 936.
61. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and
technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which
cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts can be
either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by
such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.
Id. "Fungible goods" are goods in which each particle is identical with every other
particle, such as grain and oil. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n v. Columbia Gulf
Transmission Co., 161 So. 2d 173, 178 (Miss. 1964).
62. See 1-3 Guide to Toxic Torts (MB) § 3.09(l) (2005).
63. Notice pleading requirements have been initiated in most states, even states that
still consider themselves code states. Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real
International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 306 n. 117 (1992).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
65. In jurisdictions that do not recognize market share liability, plaintiffs typically
cannot survive dismissal motions. See, e.g., Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510, 514
(10th Cir. 1994) (rejecting market share liability as a theory of recovery and affirming
lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants). However, in
jurisdictions that recognize market share liability, the inability of the plaintiff to identify
the defendant that caused her injury does not automatically warrant dismissal. See, e.g.,
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., (MTBE 11), 2005 WL
3005795, at *4 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 9, 2005); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069,
[Vol. 111:2
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liability provides an alternative to nanming specific defendants
responsible for the plaintiffs injury. It allows the plaintiff to navigate
around motions to dismiss by including all defendants who could have
been responsible for the plaintiff's injury.66
III. Analysis
A. Inadequacy of Previous Collective Liability Theories in Products
Liability Litigation and Mass Torts
The factual complexity of toxic tort and products liability litigation
requires courts to create new theories of liability and to modify existing
theories. 67 For example, the DES litigation that prompted the creation of
market share liability involved over 200 DES manufacturers.68  The
MTBE litigation includes over fifty named plaintiffs. 69 Courts also must
adhere to precedent in their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, market
share liability theories differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,70 just as
1073 (N.Y. 1989).
66. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075 (noting that other theories of collective
liability "provide no relief for the DES plaintiff unable to identify the manufacturer of the
drug that injured her," adopting market share liability, and denying defendants' motions
for summary judgment).
67. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980); see also Smith v.
Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 724 (Haw. 1991). The Cutter Biological court
noted that tort law is a continually expanding field and identified the "mass" torts as the
most recent additions. Id. In Cutter Biological, the hemophiliac plaintiff was allegedly
exposed to the AIDS virus by one of four defendants' blood products. Id. at 721-22.
68. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935; see also Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 374
(Wash. 1984). By 1984, it was estimated that as many as 300 drug companies marketed
DES between 1947 and 1971. Id.
69. See In re Methul Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig. (MTBE 1),
379 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
consolidated and transferred the MTBE cases to the Southern District of New York on
October 10, 2000. See Pending MDLs, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov (follow "Pending
MDLs" hyperlink; then follow "Products Liability" hyperlink; then follow "MDL-1358
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products Liability Litigation" hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
70. See, e.g., McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 270-71 (D.S.D. 1983)
(federal court predicted that South Dakota Supreme Court would apply the reasoning of
Sindell and adopt market share liability); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 285-
86 (Fla. 1990) (adopting market share liability with "due diligence" requirement, which
requires plaintiff to use due diligence to identify the manufacturer of the offending
product, but rejecting joint and several liability in market share liability because Florida
only uses that theory in limited situations); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 48-
50 (Wis. 1984) (adopting market share liability but cautioning that the plaintiff need not
join a "substantial share" or "reasonable number" of possible DES manufacturers, but, as
plaintiff is in the best position to identify possible defendants, the plaintiff may
commence suit against just one defendant as long as the plaintiff alleges the remaining
elements of a DES claim). But see Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 192-93
2006]
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other common law theories that vary from state to state consist of slightly
different tests in different states.
71
Faced with a case suited for market share liability but facts that did
not conform to any existing collective liability theory, the MTBE court
fashioned a theory that accommodated the facts of the litigation,
particularly the fact that the chemical properties of MTBE make
discovering the manufacturer's identity impossible.7 2 In recognizing the
inadequacy of existing theories, the court noted:
[t]he review of the various [existing] theories of collective
liability... reveals that from time to time courts have fashioned new
approaches in order to permit plaintiffs to pursue a recovery when the
facts and circumstances of their actions raised unforeseen barriers to
relief. Those courts made a policy decision that in balancing the
rights of all parties, it would be inappropriate to foreclose plaintiffs
entirely from seeking relief merely because their actions did not fit
the parameters of existing liability theories. These MTBE cases
suggest the need for one more theory, which can be viewed as a
modification of market share liability, incorporating elements of
concurrent wrongdoing.
73
An analysis of why the MTBE court found each existing theory
inadequate will illustrate how this logic may work in future cases where
courts find existing theories inapplicable.
Joint and several liability, which the MTBE court referred to as
"concurrent wrongdoing," is inadequate because the principle
traditionally has been applied when the cases involve a small number of
74potential tortfeasors. As the MTBE litigation involves many
defendants, the plaintiffs could not recover under joint and several
liability.75 Rather, all market share liability theories impose several
(Ohio 1998) (market share liability not available as a theory of recovery because Ohio's
products liability statute did not expressly provide for market share liability).
71. See Frances E. Zollers, Andrew McMullin, Sandra N. Hurd & Peter Shears, No
More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry that has Come of
Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 745, 778 (2005) ("Because strict
liability is a creature of the common law, there is some variation from state to state.").
72. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig. (MTBE 1), 379
F. Supp. 2d 348, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
73. Id. Noting that the principle is typically called "concurrent negligence," Judge
Scheindlin defined "concurrent wrongdoing" as applying to cases where more than one
defendant proximately caused the plaintiffs injury and the plaintiff experienced an
indivisible injury. In such a case, both defendants are liable. Id. at 371-72, 372 n.66.
74. Id. at 372; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) cmt. e (1965)
(noting that cases employing joint and several liability typically involve two- or three
tortfeasors).
75. See MTBE I, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
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liability rather than joint and several liability.
76
The MTBE court found concert of action liability unavailable to the
plaintiffs because they may not be able to prove that all defendants
conspired to bring MTBE into the market. 77 Although the MTBE court
found concert of action liability unavailable as a theory of recovery, the
plaintiffs' allegations set forth detailed accounts of a conspiracy among
defendants to mislead the Environmental Protection Agency and
Congress regarding the hazards of MTBE.7 s Similarly, in Smith v. Cutter
Biological, Inc., the Hawaii Supreme Court found concert of action
liability inapplicable where the plaintiff allegedly contracted AIDS from
a blood product used by hemophiliacs. 79 The Cutter Biological court
declined to apply concert of action liability because "[i]nherent in this
theory is the application of joint and several liability," and the court ruled
that joint and several liability did not apply. 0
Plaintiffs could not rely upon alternative liability because all
potential tortfeasors must be joined in order to employ alternative
liability.8' Courts employing this theory find it fair because there is a
remote chance that any one defendant actually caused the plaintiffs
injury.82 Such fairness is not present where the case involves many
defendants because the chance that any one defendant actually caused the
plaintiffs harm becomes too remote.83  Courts also avoid alternative
liability in cases with many defendants because the theory requires the
application of joint and several liability.84
The MTBE court found enterprise liability inapplicable because the
theory requires a small number of actors or potential tortfeasors.85 The
76. See, e.g., Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 487 (Cal. 1988); Conley v. Boyle
Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 287 (Fla. 1990); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d
1069, 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 383 (Wash. 1984);
Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 51 (Wis. 1984).
77. Compare MTBE I, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 372-73, with Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343
N.W.2d 164, 176 (Mich. 1984) (finding concert of action liability applicable to DES
case).
78. MTBE 1, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (citing allegations in one plaintiffs amended
complaint).
79. 823 P.2d 717, 726 (Haw. 1991).
80. Id.; see also Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1074 (finding concert of action liability
inapplicable in DES cases because parallel activity, without more, was insufficient to
prove concerted action).
81. See MTBE 1, 379 F. Supp. 2dat 373.
82. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
83. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1074 (finding alternative liability inapplicable in
DES cases because the fairness that makes the theory applicable to cases with few
defendants disappears when there are many defendants and the probability that any one
defendant caused the injury is very remote).
84. See Cutter Biological, 823 P.2d at 725.
85. MTBE I, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
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court that created enterprise liability emphasized that the theory would be
unreasonable to apply to a decentralized industry consisting of numerous
producers.8 6
* Apportioning liability based on the traditional market share liability
theory adopted by the Sindell court would require a long latency period
between the tortious act and the initiation of the plaintiffs symptoms.
8 7
Also, traditional market share requires identification of each defendant's
portion of the market.88 Therefore, the MTBE court could not apply
traditional market share to the facts of the litigation.89
B. The "Commingled Product" Theory: Designing Judicially
Attractive Market Share Liability Theories
Plaintiffs in the MTBE litigation include cities, municipal
corporations, public and private water providers, and citizens who use
property that draws water from allegedly MTBE-contaminated wells. 9°
The plaintiffs allege that defendants designed, manufactured, or
distributed MTBE-containing gasoline and that the MTBE contaminated
the plaintiffs' underground aquifers and wells. 91
The "commingled product" theory of market share liability applies
when gaseous or liquid products of many suppliers are in a "completely
commingled or blended state at the time and place that the risk of harm
occurred, and the commingled product caused a single, indivisible
injury. 92  The products are commingled to form a new mixture,
distinctive from that of each gasoline manufacturer, with each
manufacturer contributing to the injury.93 Because each manufacturer
contributes to the ultimate commingled product, each manufacturer is
deemed to have caused the injury.94 Under this theory, if a defendant's
86. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
87. MTBE 1, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 15 cmt. c (1998).
89. MTBE I, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
90. Id. at 364.
91. Id. at 364-65. MTBE is a byproduct of the gasoline refining process. Id. at 364.
It is highly soluble, not readily biodegradable, and races through the underwater
groundwater supply, contaminating wells and aquifers. Id. at 365. MTBE causes a foul
taste and odor to waters and renders those waters unusable and unfit for human
consumption. Id. Plaintiffs allege that MTBE is carcinogenic in animals and possibly
also in humans. Id.
92. Id. at 377-78. The MTBE court contemplated that the "commingled product"
theory could apply not only to MTBE-containing gasoline, but also to liquid propane or
alcohol. Id. at 378.
93. Id. at 378. Once MTBE is released into the environment, it lacks a "chemical
signature" that would enable identification of the refinery or company that manufactured
the particular batch of MTBE-containing gasoline. Id. at 365.
94. Id. at 378.
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product was present in the relevant area of contamination and
commingled with the products of other gasoline suppliers, all of the
suppliers can be held liable for any harm arising from groundwater
contamination.
95
The "commingled product" theory apportions damages according to
traditional market share liability: 96 damages are apportioned according to
proof of a defendant's market share "at the time a risk of harm was
created to a class of potential victims." 97  Like other market share
liability theories, the "commingled product" theory allows a defendant to
exculpate itself by "proving that its product was not present at the
relevant time or in the relevant place, and therefore could not be a part of
the new commingled or blended product., 98 This theory also requires
plaintiffs to conduct "some investigation" and make a good faith
identification of the defendants whom they believe caused their
injuries. 99
The investigation component of the "commingled product" theory
should be adopted in future modified market share liability theories;
perhaps it should be incorporated as an essential element of a market
share liability claim. 100 Requiring plaintiffs to investigate and include
defendants that could have caused the plaintiffs' injuries may allow
plaintiffs to rule out certain defendants. This approach could also yield
cost savings, not only to the parties, but to consumers as well. If fewer
defendants were required to provide a defense, overall litigation costs
would be lower than if more defendants were required to hire counsel
and prove that their product did not harm the plaintiffs.101
95. Id.
96. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980).
97. MTBE 1, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
98. Id.
99. Id. In this respect, the "commingled product" theory departs from most other
market share liability theories because a plaintiff "cannot just name all or substantially all
of the participants in a particular market and expect defendants to exculpate themselves."
Id. When market share liability applies because the product is commingled with products
of other manufacturers or suppliers, the conceptual basis is different than traditional
market share liability because "the defendants' products are actually present and
contributed to the injury. " Id. (emphasis added). One other market share liability theory
requires the plaintiff use "due diligence" to make a "genuine attempt to locate and to
identify the manufacturer responsible for her injury." Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.
2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1991).
100. When the Florida Supreme Court adopted the "due diligence" requirement in its
market share liability theory, it made the plaintiff's due diligence attempt an express
requirement of a market share liability claim. Conley, 570 So. 2d at 286. Thus, "[a] DES
plaintiff who cannot meet the traditional identification requirement may avail herself of
this theory of liability by commencing suit against one or more defendants and alleging:
1) that she has made a reasonable attempt to identify the manufacturer responsible for her
injury .... Id.
101. See Bruce L. Benson, Rent Seeking on the Legal Frontier, in CUTTING GREEN
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The investigation component exceeds the requirement that
allegations have factual support and that claims be warranted by existing
law. l0 2 Market share liability, by definition, provides relief to plaintiffs
who do not know which defendants caused their injuries.10 3 Therefore,
by including all or almost all mdinufacturers of a particular product as
defendants, plaintiffs comply with Rule 11 when they include market
share liability as a theory of recovery. The investigation requirement is
therefore somewhat relaxed in a traditional market share liability case.104
Making Rule I's investigation component an express requirement
in a market share liability case will reduce the temptation for plaintiffs to
simply name as defendants all product manufacturers. 10 5 Performing an
investigation to rule out some defendants is more realistic today than it
was when the Sindell court created market share liability.10 6  For
example, a company's website may include information on products that
the company manufactures and the areas in which the company
distributes those products.1
0 7
The investigation component may shorten litigation time, leading to
a faster settlement, judgment, or dismissal. Fewer defendants in a case
TAPE: Toxic POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, AND THE LAW 129, 131
(Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2000) [hereinafter Benson].
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2)-(3). A party must certify that to the best of the party's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law," id. 1 (b)(2), and that "the
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery," id. 1 (b)(3).
103. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
104. Cf Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 & 1221 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986).
In Albright, the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions in a products liability case when the
plaintiff failed to investigate proper defendants when the information needed to identify
proper defendants was not confusing or complex. Id. at 1220. The plaintiff alleged that
tetracycline-based drugs that she ingested as an infant caused permanent staining and
discoloration of her teeth. Id. at 1218. The plaintiff apparently relied on the fact that
Upjohn was "known to be a leading defendant in such actions" when she decided to name
Upjohn as a defendant. Id. at 1220.
105. See 5-55 Products Liability § 55.02(9)(a) (MB) (2005). The approaches used by
jurisdictions adopting modified market share liability theories "retain the incentive for
plaintiffs to join as many defendants as may have created the risk for the plaintiff." Id.
106. See generally, Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, 67 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir.
1995) (finding that a reasonable investor should have knowledge of information available
in the public domain, including information available on the Internet).
107. See, e.g., About Sunoco Chemicals, http://www.sunocochemicals.com/
overview/overviewf.htm (listing chemicals produced and production sites) (last visited
Sept. 1, 2006). Sunoco Chemicals is a division of Sunoco, Inc., which is one of the
defendants in the MTBE litigation pending in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
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would logically lead to lower overall litigation costs. 0 8  Such
considerations should not be overlooked, given the high cost of products
liability and toxic tort cases. 10 9 Direct litigation costs are not the only
costs of toxic tort litigation." ° For example, the significant demands
placed on court resources by toxic tort litigation create a spillover effect
for other civil litigants, causing court crowding and delay."' Lower
aggregate litigation costs will result in less spreading of those costs to the
general public. 12
The MTBE court's approach may influence courts that rejected
market share liability in the past to consider modified theories. Courts
declined to adopt market share liability theories because they found it
unfair to hold defendants liable for injuries that those defendants might
not have caused." 3 Also, courts dislike the theory because it discharges
the plaintiff from proving a causal link between the defendant's product
and the plaintiffs injury. 14 One court also expressed concern when the
state legislature had not provided for market share liability in its products
liability legislation." 5
Courts that recognize market share liability theories typically find
defendants in a better position to absorb the cost of plaintiffs' injuries. 16
108. Cf John Eichberger, Director, Motor Fuels, National Association of
Convenience Stores, Memo from Washington (July 22, 2005),
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/News/Daily-_NewsArchives/default.htm (follow
"July 2005" hyperlink; then follow "Friday, July 22, 2005 Memo from Washington"
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). "Retail[] [convenience stores] are being drawn
into multi-billion dollar product liability lawsuits related to the fuel additive MTBE. This
is forcing them to spend considerable resources on defense attorneys and threatens to
force many businesses into bankruptcy, even if they never experienced a release [of
MTBE]." Id.
109. See Benson, supra note 101, at 129, 131 (explaining that litigation costs in
products liability cases are substantially higher than in other areas of tort law such as auto
accident tort law). Benson attributes the higher costs to the instability of toxic tort law.
Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Benson remarked that in one set of asbestos cases, the resolution of the cases
was "so delaying in the progress of unrelated cases that some new method of settling
them was needed." Id. (citation omitted).
112. See PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS § 99, 695-97 (W. Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984).
113. Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Iowa 1986).
114. Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 190-93 (Ohio 1998).
115. Id.
116. See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984). In rejecting the
Sindell version of market share liability, the Collins court created its own version of the
theory that considered the culpability of each defendant in marketing a product that
caused injury to the general public and the plaintiff. Id.; see also Thomas ex rel.
Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 558 (Wis. 2005) (extending "risk-contribution"
theory of market share liability to lead paint poisoning litigation).
Judge Weinstein noted that one factor in assessing the social utility of a defendant's
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Defendants have several choices when spreading the cost of the
judgment or settlement in a market share case."l 7 First, the defendant can
insure itself against liability," 8 while the plaintiffs cannot. Second, the
defendant may be in a better position to absorb the damage award." 9
Third, the defendant may pass the cost along to the consuming public as
a cost of doing business. 2  Damages awards also act as incentives for
defendants to pursue adequate safety measures for the products that they
manufacture' 2 ' and implement safer alternatives.
C. Under Rule 11, are Plaintiffs Safe to Plead Market Share Liability in
a Jurisdiction that has Rejected the Theory?
Advocates should not shy away from pleading market share
liability, or a modified version of the theory, in states that have
previously rejected the theory or one of its modifications. Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 22 requires a plaintiff to pursue only
activity is the "relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of the injury and
the availability of means by which the loss may be shifted or spread." Hall v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).




121. See id. The Collins court concluded that the incentive involved in passing
plaintiffs' damages onto manufacturers is "especially important in the case of mass-
marketed drugs because consumers and their physicians in most instances rely upon
advice given by the supplier and the scientific community, and consequently, are virtually
helpless to protect themselves from the serious injuries caused by deleterious drugs." Id.
at 50. This reasoning applies by analogy to non-drug cases, such as the MTBE case,
because manufacturers are in the best positions to know the harms and risks associated
with their products. The Collins court also considered the "risk contribution" theory
because it suggests that fairness requires a manufacturer to be held liable for plaintiffs'
injuries when it created a risk that society deems unreasonable, and "not whether anyone
was injured by [its product]." Id. at 50 n.10 (quoting Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple
Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 739 (1982)).
But see Owens ex rel. Owens v. Bourns, Inc., 766 F.2d 145, 150-51 (4th Cir. 1985)
(finding insufficient evidence to prove causation in a negligence case). While the Owens
court did not find for the plaintiff, it noted that where a manufacturer may evade liability
because the plaintiff cannot be reasonably certain that the manufacturer caused plaintiff's
injury, the manufacturer's incentive to reduce the risk associated with its product is
diminished. Id. at 151 n.10. In that case, "[s]uch manufacturers may impose
unreasonable risks on others with tragic consequences without having to pay the costs of
the harm they do." Id.
122. Many states have adopted rules similar to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. E.g., I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(1) (Idaho); ALM R. Civ. P. RULE 11 (Mass.) (attorney's
signature constitutes a certification that there is good ground to support the pleading);
N.C. SUPER. CT. RULE 6 (attorney's signature constitutes a certification that, to the best of
her knowledge, information, and belief, there are good grounds to support the motion
filed in a civil action); OHIO Civ. R. 11; TENN. CIv. PROC. RULE 11.02(2); U.R.C.P.
1 I(b)(2) (Utah).
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those claims warranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law. 123 If an attorney has a reasonable argument
that the facts of the case warrant adoption of market share liability or a
modified theory, the argument likely falls within Rule 11 's directive.
24
For example, in Johnson v. Riddle, the plaintiff argued a theory that the
Tenth Circuit predicted the Utah Supreme Court would reject. 125 Still,
the plaintiff's arguments did not fall outside of Utah's Rule 11 pleading
requirement. 1
26
Attorneys drafting complaints that include multiple liability theories
must take care to plead each theory separately. 127 Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to "state as many separate claims
or defenses as the party has .... While some courts will permit
parties to file complaints containing "blanket allegations" that collapse
elements of liability theories, some courts will dismiss complaints that
use such techniques. 1
29
D. Unresolved Issues
Following the pattern of creation of market share liability theories,
the "commingled product" theory could benefit from further adaptation.
While the "commingled product" theory's requirement that plaintiffs first
investigate and make a good faith identification of appropriate
defendants represents a tremendous step forward for the flexibility of
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(2).
124. Cf Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. 1997)
(rejecting market share liability in lead paint poisoning litigation, but noting that the court
would be willing to adopt the theory in the appropriate situation).
125. Johnson v. Riddle, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1292 (D. Utah 2003).
126. Id. However, the Johnson court cautioned that Rule I 's broad language does
not create a "green light" for attorneys to plead any theory they wish. Id.
127. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bone Screw), No. MDL
1014, 1996 WL 482977, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1996).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
129. Bone Screw, 1996 WL 482977, at *12. The Bone Screw court permitted the
plaintiffs to file amended complaints. Id. at * 13. The court set forth requirements that
plaintiffs had to follow in their amended complaints, including a requirement that "[e]ach
claim alleging a separate theory of liability must be pleaded separately under a separate
heading." Id. at * 12. However, the court emphatically cautioned:
THE COURT REMINDS THE PARTIES THAT ITS SUGGESTIONS IN
THIS MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE
ALLEGED IS NOT A LICENSE TO BYPASS FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDCURE 11. NOTHING SHOULD BE ALLEGED IN ANY
AMENDED OR REFILED COMPLAINT THAT DOES NOT SATISFY ALL
APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT OF RULE 11.
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liability theories, the investigation requirement is undercut by the MTBE
court's statement that "plaintiffs have an incentive to name all potential
tortfeasors to maximize recovery."'' 30 A defendant would only be liable
for its share of the damages according to its share of the market at the
time that the risk of harm was created.13 1 Therefore, by naming all
potential tortfeasors, the plaintiff optimizes her chance to recover 100%
of her damages. 132  However, the investigation requirement seems to
indicate the opposite: that the plaintiffs should not name every potential
tortfeasor unless their investigation leads to that conclusion.
133
The better alternative would require plaintiffs to conduct some
investigation and make a good faith identification of defendants whose
products were in the relevant zone of injury. In cases that adopt the
"commingled product" theory in the future, emphasis should be put on
the investigation requirement rather than the plaintiff's incentive to name
all potential tortfeasors to maximize recovery. The better solution may
be for future courts to omit the "incentive" language.
E. Judicial Adaptation or Activism?
Some courts remain open to adapting their states' liability theories
to include market share liability and modified market share theories.
134
However, other courts adopt the position that it is appropriate for
legislatures to handle such change by statute, rather than having courts
do so by adopting alternative theories of liability.'35 Another court found
130. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig. (MTBE 1), 379




134. See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984) (adopting
"market share alternative liability," which apportions liability based on the "risk of injury
to the public, and, consequently, the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs."); Collins v. Eli
Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984); see also MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 198 (1993). Shapo reported that his study of
thousands of judicial decisions and attendance at and reading of Congressional hearings
on products liability litigation shows "when it comes to developing rules that respond to
data, the courts have produced what is probably the best working balance ofjustice." Id.
Discussing proposed products liability legislation, Shapo noted that "only courts can
probe the factual intricacies of particular disputes." Id.
135. Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); see also Smith v.
Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 736 (Hawaii 1991) (Moon, J., dissenting). Justice
Moon counseled judicial restraint and compared the situation to a ruling by that court that
refused to expand Hawaii's dram shop law to allow a wrongful death action for the
family of a deceased minor. Cutter Biological, 823 P.2d at 736 (Moon, J., dissenting). In
refusing to extend Hawaii law in that case, the Hawaii Supreme Court noted the
legislature carried the authority to extend liability to minors. See id. (citing Winters v.
Silver Fox Bar, 797 P.2d 51, 56 (Hawaii 1990)). The judiciaries of Hawaii and New
York could not be further apart in their approaches to adoption of modified theories to
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market share liability inconsistent with the state's tort law principles and
public policy.
136
However, some jurists accept the adaptation of liability theories.
137
Toxic tort and products liability litigation is particularly well suited for
adaptable theories due to ever-changing manufacturing and distributing
methods. Principles of tort law should adapt as society and technology
change so that tort law can address the realities of the situations which it
is called upon to remedy.
138
Courts should not forego adopting modified market share liability
theories for fear of accusations that they are engaging in judicial
activism. As the cases show, market share liability need not be adopted
in its pure form to be effective. 139 Rather, the flexibility of the theory
provides the tools for a court to mold its own version of market share
liability that draws on the state's policies and principles.
F. Applying the "Commingled Product" Theory's Rationale in
Environmental Toxic Torts
Application of the "commingled product" theory in future cases will
mostly likely be limited to environmental contamination, toxic tort, or
allow for a plaintiffs recovery.
136. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 245-47 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). The
Zaffi court rejected the trial court's adaptation of market share liability, which would
have allowed the plaintiffs to recover damages under
the traditional elements of a products liability action, that defendants knew that
the product would be sold and used in a manner such that identification with a
particular manufacturer would be impossible. If plaintiffs further allege[d] that
they were unable, through no fault of their own, to identify the manufacturer,
their claims [would have withstood] dismissal.
Id. at 246.
137. See Harry B. Frank, A View of the Law of Products Liability, in LEGAL ESSAYS
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ADVOCATE 391, 391 (Robert Klonsky ed. 1961).
There is no field where the need for judicial flexibility, imagination and
adaptability to realities is greater than in that of the products liability law.
Science, technology and mechanical complexity have been advancing at a
dazzling pace, but all too often the legal response to such progress has been
rigidity and a frustrating adherence to outmoded formalisms and precedents.
Id. But see RICHARD H. GASKINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS 174 (1989) [hereinafter
GASKINS] (noting that political pressure on courts can discourage judicial creativity). See
generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921)
(noting that adherence to precedent "ceases to be a good when it becomes a uniformity of
oppression"). Departing from such precedents shows the "way the courts have gone
about their business for centuries in the development of common law." Id. at 116.
138. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 284 (Fla. 1990). The Supreme
Court of Florida recognized a "'continuing responsibility to the citizens of [Florida]' to
modernize traditional principles of tort law when... necessary 'to ensure that the law
remains both fair and realistic as society and technology change."' Id. (quoting Ins. Co.
of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 451 (Fla. 1984)).
139. See Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984).
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pollution cases 40 due to the theory's requirement that the injurious
products be fungible and in such a commingled state that they form a
new, blended product. 14 1 In addition, the "commingled product" theory,
and market share liability in general, may prove especially useful in
environmental pollution litigation due to the difficulty of proving the
"causal connection between the injury and actions by (or imputed to) the
defendant."' 142  However, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 143 may bar the application of
the "commingled product" theory in environmental contamination cases
.because CERCLA provides its own liability requirements.1
44
Perhaps the "commingled product" theory could be applied in
products liability cases with factual situations similar to the welding rods
litigation. In those cases, the plaintiffs were allegedly injured by
inhaling fumes emitted while using welding rods that contain
manganese. 45 If a court were to determine that the welding rods were
fungible products and that the fumes allegedly emitted by the rods
created a new commingled, blended product, a court could possibly
apply the "commingled product" theory to the welding rods litigation. 146
Scholars suggest that market share liability could apply to apportion
damage to orbiting satellites when they collide with orbiting debris.
147
Space debris consists of trash deposited in space, including rocket
fragments, discarded hand tools, and abandoned nuclear reactors. 48
Because it would be impossible for the Earth-bound to determine which
piece of debris caused the damage, liability would be apportioned based
on each country's share of trash deposited in orbit. 149 The "commingled
140. Earl Hagstr6m, Remarks during the Mealey's MTBE Teleconference: New
Groundbreaking Rules in the Federal MDL (Oct. 11, 2005) (notes on file with author).
Hagstr6m opined that the "commingled product" theory may be unique to the MTBE
litigation. Id.
141. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig. (MTBE 1), 379
F. Supp. 2d 348, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
142. GASKINS, supra note 137, at 174.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2005).
144. See New Jersey Tpk. Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 460, 471 (D.N.J.
1998). Given the statutory requirements for establishing liability under CERCLA, the
burden shifting framework of market share liability may be inapplicable. Id.
145. In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig, 364 F. Supp. 2d 669, 673 (N.D. Ohio
2005).
146. See California Plaintiffs File Unique Class Action Seeking'Medical Monitoring
Relief 2-9 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: WELDING RODS, Dec. 16, 2005, at 7. The California
plaintiffs filed a class action seeking medical monitoring due to exposure to welding
smoke and manganese fumes. Id. "To partition the cost of providing medical
monitoring, the plaintiffs propose adoption of the market share liability model." Id.
147. See Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional
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product" theory could apply to space debris if the total sum of trash in
orbit is considered to form a commingled blend of "space trash."
'1 50
Even if courts determine that the "commingled product" theory
should be limited to the MTBE litigation, the rationale behind the
theory-modifying market share liability to fit the facts of the case-can
be employed in cases that do not fit the mold of the "commingled
product" theory.
IV. Conclusion
The "commingled product" theory is an example of judicial
initiative in finding ways to prevent dismissal when innocent plaintiffs
allege a legitimate injury and cannot identify the manufacturer of the
product that caused the injury. As technology evolves and cases become
more complex, it will become increasingly important for courts to craft
practical theories that react to the facts of the litigation. This new theory
can be adopted by courts that have been hesitant to adopt traditional
market share liability theory and is an example of a court's ability to
create a collective liability theory that works with the facts of the
litigation.
The "commingled product" theory's investigation requirement
should be adopted by other courts that have declined to adopt a market
share liability theory or wish to fashion a fact-specific liability theory.
The requirement could shorten litigation and decrease overall litigation
costs, which would benefit not only the parties involved, but also the
public, consumers, and litigants in unrelated cases who could be affected
by overcrowded dockets and delay.
150. The MTBE court considered the commingled molecules of MTBE in a vast
amount of groundwater to form a "new commodity created by commingling the products
of various suppliers" for the purpose of applying market share liability. In re Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig. (MTBE 1), 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 378
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). The same reasoning could apply by analogy to space trash, considering
how small and unidentifiable each individual piece is in relation to the entire orbital path
of a satellite.
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